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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss the process we are using in the design and implementation of a tool to improve the situation awareness
of cyberattacks in the power grid. We provide details of the steps we have taken to date and describe the steps that still need to be
accomplished. The focus of this work is to provide situation awareness of the power grid to staff from different, non-overlapping roles in
an electrical transmission organization in order to facilitate an understanding of a possible occurrence of a cyberattack. Our approach
follows a user-centered design process and includes determining the types of information to display, the format of the displays, and the
personnel to whom the display should be shown. Additionally, there is the issue of how much help the tool can provide in the way of
assessing the probability of a cyberattack given the current status of various portions of the power grid. Regardless, the ability to provide a
common operating picture should enable the various groups to collaborate on a response.
Keywords:

cybersecurity, power grid, situation awareness, user-centered design

Introduction
Cybersecurity has become a crucial topic in many, if not all, aspects of modern life. The power grid is no exception.
In fact, the power grid is especially vulnerable to attacks as it is an aging infrastructure to which new technologies are being
added. Additionally there are three different groups responsible for different aspects of the electrical transmission systems:
the cybersecurity group responsible for the enterprise networks, the engineers responsible for maintaining the energy
delivery system network, and the dispatchers responsible for the safety and reliable delivery of power. Not only are the
groups distinct, they may well be geographically dispersed as well. These three groups are the major players in discovering
and dealing with cyberattacks on the transmission power grid. Cyberattacks can start in the enterprise network and spread to
the energy delivery system network. If not discovered quickly, the dispatchers may lose the ability to stop the shutdown of
the electrical grid. Our work intends to improve the decision-making process by designing and developing displays to
provide improved situation awareness (SA) of issues in the system indicative of a potential cyberattack.
Why is the power grid so susceptible to cyberattacks? The bulk electric system (BES) consists of generation, transmission, and distribution systems all of which contain a significant proportion of legacy devices, software, and communication protocols. At the time these systems were installed, physical protection was needed for safe operation. Today
these systems are connected, however loosely, to Enterprise and IT (information technology) networks that have much
shorter life cycles and are more adept at dealing with modern cybersecurity risks. In addition network substations are often
connected by third party communication providers. The result is better communications and operations, but at the expense
of expanding the overall attack surface of the energy delivery systems infrastructure. Moreover, the connections between
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the different components, even though very loose, mean
that bad actors can use such things as ‘‘phishing attacks’’ to
enter the Enterprise system and eventually gain access to
other components of the system.
Our goal is to analyze the current utility practices and
identify how the various sources of information can be
combined effectively to provide actionable and timely
information to the dispatchers, engineers, and cybersecurity
analysts to ensure the reliability and security of the BES.
We have assumed that a singular and/or a combination of
events already exist in the form of system alerts and that
they adequately function as indicators of a cyberattack.
Early identification of a cyberattack increases the likelihood that the impact of the attack can be lessened. However, we must make sure that the proper notifications are
delivered to the appropriate personnel so that authoritative
action can be taken quickly.
The Human Dimension of Cybersecurity Measures
Today’s power grid is quite reliable, especially as the
BES is designed to tolerate the loss of any single major
element, such as a generating station or transmission line,
with minimal to no impact on reliability. This is commonly
referred to as N-1 contingency analysis and covers natural
and man-made risks, such as lightning strikes, faults, and
maintenance events, and considers the contingencies
needed to mitigate those risks. Cyberattacks are a form of
man-made risk, with the additional complexity that they
could cause unexpected failures of elements across multiple substations within a short amount of time to impact the
operation of the BES. Successful cyberattacks typically
consist of various techniques executed over a period of time
(usually not short). Of the many techniques, some include
reconnaissance (learning about the infrastructure, hardware,
and software), phishing scams, hardware/software vulnerability exploitation, credential theft, passive monitoring of
the network, leveraging exploits to traverse to desired
portions of the network, and execution of malicious code/
commands. The exact implementation and methods/tools
used for cyberattacks are constantly evolving to stay ahead
of new defense mechanisms/strategies and take advantage
of the latest vulnerabilities. However, it is critical to note
that because they involve a progression through several
stages, often requiring months or even years from initial
launch to final execution, they would leave behind a trail of
anomalies that could be used for attack detection and
incident response if monitored properly. One issue is how to
recognize abnormalities that are indicative of cyberattacks
compared to everyday activities and honest mishaps, but of
equal importance, and once an abnormality is recognized,
who should be notified to take action?
Endsley (1995) defined SA as having three levels. The
first level is the perception of elements in the current situation. The second level is the comprehension of the current

situation, and the third level is the projection of possible
future states. Greitzer, Schur, Paget, and Guttromson
(2008) modified the definition in their research on the
power grid to include the aspect of sense making. In this
perspective, it is about more than providing additional data.
Improved technology, information sharing, and the representation of pertinent information are needed to help the
decision makers understand if there is a problem and, if so,
the probable cause. This would enable the decision makers
to resolve the problem more quickly and efficiently. The
sense making loop as described by Pirolli and Card (2005)
consists of structuring the problem, gathering evidence to
confirm or disconfirm various hypotheses, and eventually
making the decision. Ericsson and Lehmann (1996) noted
that experts select relevant information and encode it in
representations they use to reason about the selection of
actions. Our goal in developing the tool for SA is to also
ensure that it provides relevant information in appropriate
representations to expedite decisions.
As we have already stated, there are three groups, each
with their own set of data, that need to communicate with
each other to determine if a particular situation may be
caused by a cyberattack. We intend to provide each of the
three groups with the appropriate information to provide
them with Endsley’s second level of SA—comprehension
of the current situation—not just of each individual piece
but of the entire transmission network. If each group has
the current SA, then it should be feasible for them to
assemble a holistic picture of the entire system and explain
any irregularities they see. They should be able to determine if this is due to a cyberattack or can be explained
by other irregularities that frequently occur in such large
complex systems. For example, an issue that shows up in
the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
network that is used to control transmission is most often
due to a cause other than a cyberattack. But if there is also
a problem in the Enterprise network, the combination may
be indicative of a cyberattack. The ability to see the SA
not only of their particular area but the SA of the entire
transmission network should facilitate sense makers to
determine if a cyberattack is occurring and should help the
groups to communicate to mitigate the situation.
Therefore we need to determine: (1) what information
is needed, (2) who should see the information, (3) how the
information should be displayed, and (4) what, if any, help
could a tool provide in assessing the probability of a cyberattack. As there are many anomalies that can occur in these
systems, we need to ensure that the new displays do not generate an abundance of false alarms, which could become a
distraction or cause personnel to ignore the displays altogether.
There are a number of issues that need to be considered.
Personnel at utilities occupy several non-overlapping roles,
each with different tasks, responsibilities, tools, and data.
Control room dispatchers, IT personnel, and cybersecurity
analysts are collectively responsible for the cybersecurity of
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the system as a whole. Determining how to display data
and establish common ground is challenging when users
come to the system with varying expertise and familiarity.
To further complicate matters, these roles often work
completely different hours with grid dispatchers on duty
24 hours per day, 7 days a week in shifts, and most supporting roles only during traditional business hours during the
week. With such different organizational roles, interaction between groups does not usually occur until there is
an event. In fact, these groups may lack some of the basic
knowledge about types of equipment, possible vulnerabilities, and typical operations of the other groups (Scholtz,
Franklin, LeBlanc, & Andersen, 2015).
Control room dispatchers are responsible for maintaining
the safe and reliable operation of their portion of the electrical system. Consequently, they already have many displays to monitor. They must respond to alerts and act
quickly and responsibly to various conditions, following
standard procedures. They monitor the flow of electricity in
the network, weather conditions, anticipated power demand,
the conditions of equipment, and any scheduled maintenance
that will impact the system. Adding more displays to monitor
will increase their workload, so the information presented
must be useful and easily accessible to them. Additionally,
they will most likely need to communicate with others in the
event that a cyberattack is suspected, which could result in
more time needed to respond to alerts.
Separate from direct grid control, the IT and cyber
analysts maintain the cyber tools on the network, do
analysis on the large amounts of data from monitoring the
network, and provide forensic analysis to determine what
caused various incidents. While some aspects of networks
are monitored in real time, log analysis is typically done
after a problem arises and only on a small subset of logs
deemed directly relevant to the apparent problem at hand.
The majority of network information is otherwise neglected. Hence, without noticeable effects to draw attention,
it might take days to determine that something amiss had
happened in the enterprise or energy delivery system network. Meanwhile, energy delivery system network engineers are tasked with maintaining the control systems,
incorporating patches, testing out new versions of software,
and keeping backup systems, but are not currently tasked
with watching the network. Some power utilities are now
establishing cyber monitoring capabilities on their energy
delivery system networks.
Currently, SA of potentially harmful cyber conditions is
not readily available at a higher, regional level. Individual
power companies are responsible for reporting issues that
would impact the power grid to their assigned reliability
coordinator. Reliability coordinators are responsible for
identifying issues that impact a wide area and appropriately
disseminating information to the impacted parties. These
communications are usually accomplished via a phone call
or an email. In addition, few utilities are anxious to provide

access to their staff or to discuss cybersecurity incidents
that may have occurred in their systems.
These factors need to be thoroughly understood as any
tool conceived to help in diagnosing and stopping, or at
least limiting, the impact of cybersecurity attacks needs to
operate within the constraints of the groups. Our procedure
for the design and implementation of such a tool takes these
factors into consideration and is the basis of this paper.
Prior and ongoing work is being leveraged in support of
our display designs. In particular, we are looking at using
event reasoning tools to aid in decision making and routing
of messages to appropriate individuals for action. Any number of events or alerts can be generated from a vast array
of problems on the grid, and any single event may or may
not be of interest in the control room. However, a unique
combination of events occurring in series or in parallel
may indeed be an indicator of cyber activity in a remote
asset. An event reasoning tool can be used to quickly
aggregate individual alerts or events, analyze the combinations to determine if the threat is legitimate, and then be
configured to send a notification to the proper authority
for action. Figure 1 depicts a block diagram showing how
this might work.
While control alarms are highly accurate, cybersecurity
alarms rely on algorithms to detect events. These algorithms can certainly miss events, so developing our event
reasoning tool will need to take into account the costs of
missing an event versus the costs of false alarms. The
reasoning tool will certainly have to be iteratively tested
during design and development to ensure that the balance of
possible false alarms to missed events is reasonable. As more
sophisticated cyberattacks occur the event reasoning system
may have to be updated to take new tactics into account.
Method
We have found that a user-centered approach to developing tools is essential to their adoption in the workplace.
Therefore our plan was to obtain as much information
as possible about the tasks of those involved in the BES.
As we work in a technical organization, we are well aware
of the tasks of cybersecurity analysts and the tools they
use. Some of our team are researchers in the electric grid
and understand its functions and the tasks needed to
maintain it, including security issues. However, the dispatchers’ tasks are relatively unfamiliar to us. Therefore,
we decided to start our user-centered work with the dispatchers and then continue to integrate this knowledge with
information about the other two groups of users. As a
number of the team members have backgrounds in visual
analytics, we felt that using some sort of visualizations
would be useful to convey the essentials of the SA to
our users. As the amount of data is overwhelming, the
application of some reasoning tools displayed in one or
more visualizations seems to be a reasonable goal. As this
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Figure 1. Schematic of an event reasoning tool.

is ongoing work, the discussion of our procedure is separated into completed, partially completed, and planned
steps. For the completed steps, we discuss what we did,
as well as the information we were able to gather. For the
partially completed steps, we discuss the methodology
used, the information collected to date, and our next steps.
For the planned steps, we discuss what we plan at this
point in time and the information we hope to obtain from
those steps.
Completed Steps
Our first step was to establish a partnership with a transmission utility so that we could begin our user-centered
design process with interviews and observations with utility
personnel in a variety of roles. After our partnership was
established, we assembled our human factors team and
formulated a semi-structured interview procedure, along
with some initial questions. We started in the control room
with the dispatchers as this was the group we had the least
knowledge of at the start.

N Dispatchers rely on well-defined procedures for communications.
GridEx Participation
Additionally, we were offered an opportunity to observe
our power utilities’ participation in GridEx III (2016).
GridEx is a biennial exercise that simulates a cyber/
physical attack on the electrical infrastructures across the
United States. The exercise lasted two days and several
dispatchers, as well as a cybersecurity analyst from our
partner utility, participated in the simulation. On the first
day of the exercise, a series of physical attacks combined
with eventual energy delivery system network and communications compromises caused security deployments
to critical substations, evacuations, lines being opened,
and substations being islanded. On the second day of the
exercise, a plane dragging metal wire took out a substation
and malicious code was found in some telemetered data.
Our findings from this exercise included:

N There was a safety issue with sending personnel to a
Interviews and Observations
Three members of the human factors team participated in
two sets of semi-structured interviews and observations
with the dispatchers. We were able to meet with 12 of the
15 dispatchers during these two sets of interviews. We
worked as a team of two, with one person primarily asking
the questions and the other taking notes. We interviewed
on-duty dispatchers in their control room when they were
not actively engaged in tasks. When dispatchers were busy,
we observed their procedures, workflows, points of coordination with other utility personnel, and used that opportunity to formulate more questions about their tasks.
Our findings with respect to cybersecurity can be summarized as follows:

N The dispatchers cannot be solely responsible for monitoring systems for cybersecurity.

N Dispatchers need operable statements in order to formulate a response.

substation for investigation. This issue delayed the
response that dispatchers would normally make.
N Not all players understood what equipment was in the
substations.
N Malicious code was not identified by the tools in place,
so the cyber analyst was not aware of it.
It is worth noting that while a utility can be in compliance with North American Electric Reliability Corporation critical infrastructure protection plan (NERC CIP), this
does not mean that it will be able to solve the problem.
In particular, rolling a truck to the substation could have
fixed the issue of malicious code, but would not have
provided any indication of how it got there.
Our human factors team, along with some more technical
members of our team, visited two other groups of people
who are responsible for maintaining and monitoring the
networks: the cyber analysts and the information system
security officers (ISSOs). From the cyber analysts, we
obtained information about a typical day, the tools used to
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monitor the business network, the information obtained, and response plans for cyber incidents. Their tasks
include:

N Maintenance of network tools (to ensure current
picture of network).

N Investigation of ‘‘offenses.’’
N Communication with parties responsible for mitigation.
N Support of network integration activities.
Information was obtained about the cyber alarms and
how this group responded to those. An important outcome
of these discussions was a confirmation of what the team
had observed on the second day of GridEx III. Specifically,
the cyber analysts charged with investigation of offenses
and anomalies were not trained in grid operations, nor were
they familiar with the specialized equipment that appeared
in their networks. This reinforces the point that there is a
lack of common ground between the grid dispatchers who
would encounter the manifestation of cyberattacks, and the
cyber analysts who would be called in to assist in remediating the problem.
We visited with the ISSOs, who are in charge of assets
which process operational data, such as SCADA (a type of
energy delivery system) networks, and ensuring that the
systems under their authority meet the Federal Information
Security Management Act (FISMA) security requirements.
They have specific regions/networks they are responsible
for and they coordinate with regional staff as needed.
Regional SCADA network managers are utilized for audit
evidence collection. The tasks of the ISSOs include:

N Investigating offenses passed to them by the cyber
analysts.

N Mitigating vulnerabilities discovered by the cyber
analysts.

N Conducting SCADA network assessments for FISMA
audits.

N Conducting general support system assessments for
FISMA audits.

N Planning for addressing failed audit standards (‘‘ProAms’’).

N Tool vetting for new additions to monitoring capabilities.

N Handling certificate updates for software.
A list of the tools they use in their daily work was provided to us. While there was some overlap between the
ISSOs and cyber analysts in terms of tool availability, we
again established a lack of common ground and coordination between the two groups. Particularly, the process of
handing partially started investigations from cyber analysts
to ISSOs was fraught with communication delays and difficulties in tracking status.
While we were pleased with the information we received from our interviews and observations, we deemed it
necessary to determine how well this generalized to other

utilities. In the following section, we describe the survey
we used to determine this.
Developing Use Cases
Use cases are helpful in user-centered design for clarifying who will be using a system and under what conditions. This aids visual design by providing context, as well
as example information to display. Therefore, we needed to
identify several combinations of abnormalities that would
signify a potential cyberattack as our use cases. Our team,
with input from other experts at our organization, came up
with three possible scenarios. Before we used these in our
early design efforts, we wanted to collect more information
from our potential user base. We designed a survey to be
sent to a wider base of potential users which asked questions that we had asked in our interviews, as well as feedback on these use cases.
We received 33 responses, of which: 22 participants identified themselves as dispatchers, 8 identified themselves as
IT specialists, 2 participants identified as ISSOs, and one
participant identified as a cyber security analyst. Not everyone answered every question.
We asked participants to check the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) functions that their
organization handles. The top five NERC roles represented
were: Balancing Authority, Transmission Operation, Transmission Owner, Transmission Planner, and Transmission
Service Provider. Their organizations provided other functions
as well, but the ones listed above were the most prevalent.
Dispatchers noted that their organizations had procedures for dealing with cybersecurity issues that would
affect transmission services, but also felt that it was not
completely easy to differentiate abnormalities in the system
from cyberattacks. They indicated that having a display in
the control room to provide awareness of cyberattacks
would be useful, and agreed that they would contact the IT
specialists, SCADA operations, or cyber analysts when an
attack was detected. They felt that more global information
would be useful and that they might be the appropriate
personnel to determine if a cyberattack was underway.
However, there was a lack of agreement as to whether they
were the appropriate personnel to mitigate an attack that
was underway.
As we only had 8 responses from IT specialists, with
only 7 answering the bulk of the questions, we would
caution about making generalizations from their responses.
We asked the IT specialists if they felt it was important
for them to understand how the grid operates. They felt it
was very important for them to understand how the grid
operates. However, not all of them agreed that they had this
understanding. Five of the seven respondents somewhat or
completely agreed that the right personnel were involved in
handling cyber incidents. All of the respondents somewhat
or completely agreed that they communicated directly with
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We also asked the participants some questions about
using the displays. The questions and results are in Table 2.
We presented all of the participants with three case
studies in which three or four events were happening.
We asked them to tell us what incidents or combination of
incidents would cause them to consider a cyberattack was
happening. This section was included to help us design
case studies for our initial displays that this audience would
find reasonable.
CASE ONE. The incidents are:

dispatchers on handling incidents. Five of the seven either
somewhat or completely agreed that the grid dispatchers
had a good understanding of basic security principles. Not
all of the IT specialists felt they would be able to support
restoring the grid after an attack, and not all were involved
in regular training for these incidents or even felt it was
important. Not all felt they were kept up to date on changes
in the SCADA system and not all felt they had the right
contextual knowledge to make many decisions.
We described four different displays and asked the
participants which they would find useful and when they
would use the display. The four displays were described as:

a. A breaker is shown as open, even though a control room dispatcher has not opened it and it has not
been scheduled for maintenance. The control room
dispatcher is not able to close the breaker from the
energy management system (EMS) at the dispatcher’s
workstation.
b. One of the on-duty dispatchers is logged in from both
the control room and from an unknown computer.
c. There is a loss of communications from a substation
that has shown an open breaker.
d. Two other control rooms in the regions are reporting
similar incidents.

1. The condition of the control room would be determined by malfunction of breakers, substation alarms,
loss of communications from any asset, irregular data
coming from any input, and malfunctions of any of
the computers available to the dispatchers.
2. The condition of network security would be determined by noticeable traffic increases in and out from
a baseline, new IPs accessing or accessed from the
system, multiple logins by users, irregularities in the
firewall logs, irregularities in the intrusion detection
logs, irregularities in the security information and
event management system event logs.
3. The condition of the SCADA system would be determined by multiple failed logins, loss of communications from any asset, indications of rogue device(s)
on the system, new IPs accessing or accessed from
the system, detection of malware on the system.
4. The condition of regional control rooms would be
determined by the same set of information as in display
#1 from any of the other regional control rooms.

Note that participants could select more than one answer
in each case. Figure 2a shows the number who noted that
these single incidents would indicate a probable cyberattack. Figure 2b shows the votes for a combination of two of
these incidents to indicate a probable cyberattack. Figure 2c
shows the number of participants who said which combinations of three incidents might indicate a cyberattack. We also
asked if all four incidents would be an indication. Participants
selected one or more choices of incidents or none if they felt
no conditions were indicative of a cyberattack.
CASE TWO. The incidents are:

We asked the participants to select all of the displays
they would find useful given their area of responsibility.
Note that participants could select multiple displays. The
results are shown in Table 1.

a. There is a software error in one of the EMS applications that causes the software to crash.
b. There are corrupt files reported on the EMS server.
c. There is unusually high CPU usage on the EMS server.

Table 1
Displays participants found useful—could vote for more than one.
Display
Display
Display
Display

one: condition of the control room
two: condition of the network
three: condition of the SCADA system
four: condition of regional control rooms

Figure 3 shows the results for this case study. Again,
participants could select more than one answer.
CASE THREE. The incidents in this case are:

11
18
25
14

a. There is an indication that there is malware on the
EMS server.

Table 2
Questions asked about using the displays.
Question
I would only use the display when I
encountered a problem in my area
If I see that another area has a problem
as well as my area I will call that area
It would make it difficult to make a
decision if there are indicated
problems in multiple displays

Completely Disagree Somewhat Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat Agree

Completely Agree

4

6

6

8

5

0

1

3

7

16

4

6

8

7

0
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Figure 2. Case study one: (a) one incident; (b) two incidents; (c) three incidents; (d) four incidents. (Figure continued on next page)
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Figure 2b. (Continued)

b. The control room finds that the historian data is incorrect.
c. Another control room in the region has reported an
incident.
Figure 4 shows the results for this case study.
Respondents also gave us alternative explanations for the
use cases which referenced other established grid conditions, such as equipment failure and forgotten communications. We will utilize this information in designing initial
displays and functionality of the tool.
Semi-Completed
For the next phase of our work, we took the information
described above and started turning this into a visual design
of what a tool might look like. This step is called prototyping and is used to gather feedback from intended users.
We begin our prototyping process with wireframes.
These are drawings of the user interface that have the
advantage of having enough fidelity to communicate features, interactions, and workflows, but do not require
extensive polish or resources to implement. This allows
us to get feedback from potential users early and make
improvements early, prior to actual software development.
Our utility partners are free to critique wireframes, pick
pieces they like, throw pieces away, and even redraw them
if they are so inclined. Wireframes also allow us to ask
about new ideas: if something has been difficult to communicate in words alone, a simple sketch or wireframe
provides something more specific for potential users to
revise before time and effort is spent to truly implement it.
With wireframes, the cost of iteration is low and so early
designs can be refined and would also receive user buy-off
without requiring lengthy re-implementation cycles.
Our first prototypes focused on providing a solution to
effectively address a small set of anomalies. Figure 5 shows

a wireframe mock-up of the interface we might present to
a grid dispatcher to give them information about the events
of a use case.
Using the information from our interviews and survey,
we felt we had enough information to begin a design of our
visualization that would convey information about the realtime status of the enterprise networks, the SCADA network,
and the bulk electrical transmission to our three major groups
of users.
In Figure 5, we provide the dispatcher with a short title
and descriptive text to explain the issue detected. In this
case, an unexpected remote terminal unit reboot has occurred after a potential substation breach, which makes the
reboot suspicious. The dispatcher is also given a list of
which resources could be affected or experiencing problems. A list of others in the utility that are also impacted
is provided, along with a list of those who have already
been notified of the issue and contact information for the
personnel responsible for responding to the event. Details
about the exact sequence of alarms which brought the event
to the dispatcher’s attention are provided, along with potential impacts, relevant procedures, and related events.
Figure 6 is a schematic view of a control center and
the surrounding substations. This is a second set of wireframes which have also been taken to utility partners
for feedback.
Summary indicators of network activity, alarms, and incidents are provided around the sides of the grid schematic.
This wireframe does not directly address a specific use case,
but could serve as a high-level view from which a backend
system links to details about specific incidents detailed in
interfaces such as Figure 5. Feedback was generally encouraging with a few surprises. The primary concerns of our
utility partners fell into two broad categories: maintenance of
linking information and access to details.
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Figure 3. Case study two: (a) one incident; (b) two incidents; (c) three incidents.
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Figure 4. Case study three: (a) one incident; (b) two incidents; (c) three incidents.
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Figure 5. A proposed display showing that a remote terminal unit (RTU) has rebooted unexpectedly.

Figure 6. A schematic view of a control center and substations.

Concerns about the maintenance of linking information
were focused on the technical feasibility of providing the
information to populate the wireframe interfaces and the
amount of effort it would require of the technical personnel
at the utility to maintain the accuracy of the information.

For example, our wireframes provided contact information,
such as names and phone numbers of specific personnel
who were responding to an event. However, our utility
partners were concerned with how this information could
be populated and kept up to date, especially in real time.
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They had similar concerns with the listing of relevant
procedures and the ease of linking procedures to affected
equipment in real time.
A somewhat unexpected concern was the dispatchers’
interest in making sure that they had access to all the
available details through the interfaces. While our field
observations and interviews seemed to indicate that dispatchers would prefer an action-oriented set of displays that
abstracted all but the most important details, dispatchers
specifically asked how they could get specific, detailed, and
low-level information when presented with the wireframes.
This resulted in a discussion about the need for complete
transparency in any system automation and an inherent
distrust of the dispatchers towards ‘‘simplified’’ displays.
From this discussion, new design ideas arose which imply
another round of iteration on our wireframes. Our original
idea was to customize information displays by role, and
provide grid dispatchers with a simplified view while those
personnel directly working on resolving an issue had more
details in their displays. Our next iteration will instead
feature a shared, collaborative space with clear role-based
indications of who is actively working on resolving an
issue. All information available will be presented to each
person who makes use of the display, rather than separating content by role. This will provide more common
ground for occasions when grid dispatchers need to contact
other personnel.
The schematic view of the grid in Figure 6 was well
received. Grid dispatchers again asked for more detail,
specifically the inclusion of additional communication
structures in the grid that were not present in the original
schematic. They viewed the schematic wireframe as a
starting point for alerts generated by the system and envisioned navigating from the schematic ‘‘down’’ to the more
detailed wireframe of Figure 5. The additional information
around the schematic of Figure 6 was not as well received.
Utility partners considered it ‘‘noise’’ that would be ignored
most of the time and did not see a need or use for it
immediately. Instead, they asked about including information from a higher, regional level to help them detect when
problems they were experiencing were affecting the larger
grid network.
We will be using this information to iterate on our design
and collect feedback on the new design from potential
users. Once we have wireframes that are acceptable to
our users we will precede to the next step of implementing a prototype and evaluating it on a realistic testbed
environment.
Planned Steps
In addition to continuing to refine our prototypes and
obtain feedback on the displays, we have three additional
steps to undertake. We need to determine the appropriate
level of intelligence the tool should have to facilitate

sense-making, and then we need to evaluate the utility and
usability of the tool functionality and the displays. We need
to provide a prototypical testbed to use in this evaluation.
Intelligence in the Tool
In order to provide actionable information for grid
dispatchers and cybersecurity analysts at the control center
during cyberattacks, the proposed tool should have the
ability to ingest, organize, and correlate various information feeds from individual IT and operational technology
(OT) monitoring tools that are deployed across the control
network. One of the ways to organize this information is to
use a structured knowledge representation format. Specific
tool information would be organized into ‘‘ontologies’’ that
allow the information to be stored and queried efficiently in
a graph database. This graph-based representation of information serves as a basis for alert correlation by analyzing
the incoming data streams with past data streams to identify
emerging patterns and commonalities that point to potential
cyberattacks. This framework would enable the replication
of the behavior of expert analysts by translating them into
well-defined rulesets for query and correlation to discover
patterns that may not be obvious to dispatchers and analysts
right away. As an extension, the same framework could be
used to obtain high-level summaries of information and
alerts similar to the ones presented in Figures 5 and 6 that
could indicate potential cyberattacks. In addition, this type
of knowledge representation would provide the capability
to drill down from a high-level summary to the individual
alerts that were triggered as part of the individual monitoring tools to further assist the dispatchers and analysts in
their decision-making.
Testbed Implementation and Validation
In order to perform proof-of-concept testing and performance evaluation of the proposed prototype displays for
dispatchers and cybersecurity analysts, we plan to leverage
the Electricity Infrastructure Operations Center (EIOC) and
powerNET testbed capabilities at the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory (PNNL, 2016). As part of the EIOC at
PNNL, we plan to leverage a commercial EMS software
platform that is commonly used across several utilities in
North America. We are currently in the process of upgrading
this EMS platform to the latest version available, so that we
can configure it to perform realistic experimentation.
In order to perform a proof-of-concept and performance
evaluation of the proposed tool prototype for enhancing SA,
we need to develop, configure, and deploy several resources
that are part of a prototypical SCADA environment, such
as remote terminal units, intelligent electronic devices, network components (such as communication gateways and
routers), and cybersecurity components (such as firewalls,
intrusion detection systems, security information and event
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management systems, etc.). In addition to deploying several
resources, we need to configure these various IT and OT
cybersecurity tools to ensure that appropriate data streams
are available to the proposed prototype tool for performing
advanced analytics to detect anomalies.
Figure 7 shows the conceptual testbed architecture for
our experimental evaluation and validation of the developed prototype tool. In Figure 7, the dotted lines represent
the security monitoring tools (communication network
health, firewall logs, IDS logs). The solid lines indicate
control signals and mission tools (SCADA). We plan to
leverage the capabilities of the powerNET testbed environment, in conjunction with our EMS platform that is part
of the EIOC, to create a prototypical testbed environment
for our initial testing and performance evaluations. We will
be able to feed in information from the IT and OT cybersecurity monitoring tools into the proposed prototype tool
for SA during simulated experimental conditions that would
be indicative of a cyberattack as part of our field testing.
This prototypical environment, coupled with the subject
matter expertise about the various cybersecurity and EMS
tools, will enable the iterative design and refinement of
potential approaches that present information as part of the
developed displays in an effective manner.

Once we have finalized our prototype of the various displays, our next task will be to use a refined version of the
use cases and implement the designs enough to conduct
some laboratory testing. Once the EMS system is configured and our displays are installed for the various users,
we will invite participants to come and work in a simulated
environment in which our SA displays will be featured.
After an initial training session about the displays, we will
feed in data, and at some point the conditions for a possible
cyberattack will appear. We will see if and how long it
takes participants to recognize that an attack is occurring.
Assuming we are able to get participants representing
dispatchers, IT staff, and ISSOs, we are interested in which
types of participants notice the conditions first and the
communications that occur between the various roles.
While our charter in this work is the design and implementation of the visualization tool, we anticipate that the
use of this tool may bring about some organizational
changes as well. While our visualization tool can provide
the necessary data for communication, additional training
and exposure of individuals in the different user groups to
the procedures and tasks of the other groups are necessary
as well. We suspect that the usability and utility testing we
conduct will help to highlight this need.
Conclusion

Figure 7. Conceptual testbed architecture for experimental evaluation
and validation.

At this point in time, we have just developed the initial
display prototypes and received the first round of feedback on them. Based on that feedback, we are working on
a second set of wireframes that we will take back to the
customer for feedback.
We found the staff we spoke to very supportive of our
work, especially as we were highly engaged in trying to
ensure that any additional information we were going to
provide was useful to them and would be as unobtrusive as
possible to their current responsibilities. While we have had
an excellent working relationship with our utility partner,
making that initial connection was a long and arduous task.
Utilities are skeptical about providing researchers access to
their staff due to their workloads, as well as privileged information. We are hopeful that employing the user-centered
design process will produce a tool that facilitates the process
of rapidly identifying probable cybersecurity attacks and that
utilities will find value in this method of tool development.
Our next steps are to further refine our display prototypes
and to develop an acceptable level of intelligence for the
tool. Once that is done, we will use our testbed to evaluate
the usability and utility of the tools using representatives
from the power grid in simulated conditions.
One further step that could be extremely valuable is to
use our application in a future GridEx study to determine
if participants could detect any cybersecurity attacks more
quickly using this application. Of course, this would depend
on the different injects designed for the GridEx study.
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Eventually, we would like to obtain feedback on how
many utilities actually install and use the software application. We feel that the human-centric design process has
given us insights into a design that provides users with
useful and usable software applications.
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